APPENDIX 1: Treasury Management Strategy Statement Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement 2017/18

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Treasury management is defined as:
"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans, which provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council. Although the Council does not borrow to finance its capital spending plans, officers still plan and forecast the longer term cash flow position in order to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations and that it maintains balances (working capital) at a prudent and sustainable level.

1.2 Statutory and reporting requirements

The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to 'have regard to' the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council's capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals. These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by Members before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Executive & Resources Policy Development & Scrutiny Committee.

Prudential and Treasury Indicators and Treasury Strategy (this report) - This covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a Minimum Revenue Provision Policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

A Part-Year Treasury Management Report (approved by Council in December 2016) – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury strategy is meeting the strategy or whether any policies require revision.

An Annual Treasury Report – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

The Code also requires the Council to:

- Create and maintain a Treasury Management Policy Statement, which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
- Create and maintain Treasury Management Practices, which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.

- Delegate responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.

1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2017/18

The proposed strategy for 2017/18 in respect of the following aspects of the treasury management function is based on officers' views on interest rates, supplemented with leading market forecasts provided by the Council's treasury adviser, Capita Treasury Solutions.

The strategy covers two main areas:

Capital Issues

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the MRP strategy.

Treasury management Issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators that limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

2. The Capital Prudential Indicators 2016/17 to 2019/20

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The outputs of the capital expenditure plans are reflected in prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members to overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

2.1 Capital Expenditure. This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts (as per the capital monitoring and review report to Executive on 8th February 2017):

Capital Expenditure	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
Education	29.7	16.0	32.9	7.1	0.2
Care Services	3.1	4.4	11.2	0.0	0.0
Environment	6.5	9.1	15.0	9.4	4.0
Renewal & Recreation	1.5	2.1	4.6	0.0	0.0
Resources	35.2	22.0	23.3	9.2	1.0
Public Protection & Safety	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-Total	**76.2**	**53.7**	**87.0**	**25.7**	**5.2**
Add: Future new schemes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5
Less: Estimated slippage	0.0	-3.5	-10.0	5.0	5.0
Grand Total	**76.2**	**50.2**	**77.0**	**30.7**	**12.7**

NB. The above financing need excludes other long term liabilities (finance lease arrangements), which already include borrowing instruments.

The table below shows how the above capital expenditure plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding need (borrowing).

Capital Expenditure	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
Total Expenditure	**76.2**	**50.2**	**77.0**	**30.7**	**12.7**
Financed by:					
Capital receipts	3.4	16.3	7.4	19.5	8.4
Capital grants/contributions	34.2	23.9	49.7	11.1	4.2
General Fund	-	-	-	-	-
Revenue contributions *	38.6	10.0	19.9	0.1	0.1
Net financing need	**76.2**	**50.2**	**77.0**	**30.7**	**12.7**

* These are approved contributions from the revenue budget, earmarked to fund specific schemes.

2.2 The Council's Borrowing Need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. If the CFR is positive, the Council may borrow from the Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing). The Council's CFR represents liabilities arising from finance leases entered into in recent years in respect of various items of plant and equipment (primarily equipment in schools and vehicles and plant built into highways and waste contracts). The Council currently has no external borrowing as

such. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

CFR	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
Total CFR	**3.8**	**2.8**	**2.2**	**1.6**	**1.0**
Movement in CFR	**-0.5**	**-1.0**	**-0.6**	**-0.6**	**-0.6**

Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	-0.5	-1.0	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6
Movement in CFR	**-0.5**	**-1.0**	**-0.6**	**-0.6**	**-0.6**

2.3 MRP Policy Statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to make additional voluntary payments (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG Regulations require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision.

The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

MRP will be based on the estimated lives of the assets, in accordance with the regulations, and will follow standard depreciation accounting procedures. Estimated life periods will be determined under delegated powers. To the extent that expenditure is not on the creation of an asset and is of a type that is subject to estimated life periods that are referred to in the guidance, these periods will generally be adopted by the Council. However, the Council reserves the right to determine useful life periods and prudent MRP in exceptional circumstances where the recommendations of the guidance would not be appropriate.

In practice, the Council's capital financing MRP is assessed as 4% of the outstanding balance on the finance leases the Council has entered into. A Voluntary Revenue Provision (VRP) may also be made in respect of additional repayments.

2.4 The Use of the Council's Resources and the Investment Position

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves, etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales, etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year end balances for each resource and anticipated day to day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
General Fund balance	20.0	14.6	14.6	14.6	14.6
Capital receipts	29.6	21.5	25.6	7.2	17.4
Capital grants	18.7	43.1	35.3	25.2	15.1
Provisions	12.9	12.9	12.9	12.9	12.9
Other (earmarked reserves)	101.7	85.7	74.9	63.9	64.8
Total core funds	**182.9**	**177.8**	**163.3**	**123.8**	**124.8**
Working capital*	78.2	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0
Under/over borrowing**	24.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Investments	**285.5**	**257.8**	**243.3**	**203.8**	**204.8**

*Working capital balances shown are estimated year end; these may be higher mid-year.

2.5 Affordability Prudential Indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. In practice, these indicators are virtually irrelevant for Bromley, as we have no external borrowing other than residual finance leases. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

2.6 Actual and estimates of the ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream. This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	%	%	%	%	%
Non-HRA	-	-	-	-	-

2.7 Estimates of the incremental impact of capital investment decisions on Band D council tax. This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended to the Executive in February compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. Only a very small proportion of the changes proposed will involve a contribution from Council resources and this will not impact on the level of Council Tax in future years. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£	£	£	£	£
Council tax - band D	-	-	-	-	-

3. Treasury Management Strategy

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of approporiate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current Portfolio Position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2016 is summarised below, together with forward projections. The table shows the actual external borrowing (the treasury management operations), against the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
External borrowing					
Borrowing at 1 April	-	24.4	-	-	-
Expected change in borrowing	24.4	-24.4	-	-	-
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	3.8	2.8	2.2	1.6	1.0
Expected change in OLTL	-0.5	-1.0	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6
Actual borrowing at 31 March	**24.4**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CFR – the borrowing need	**3.8**	**2.8**	**2.2**	**1.6**	**1.0**
Under / (over) borrowing	**28.2**	**2.8**	**2.2**	**1.6**	**1.0**
Investments	**285.5**	**257.8**	**243.3**	**203.8**	**204.8**
Net investments	**257.3**	**255.0**	**241.1**	**202.2**	**203.8**
Change in Net investments	+8.9	-2.3	-13.9	-38.9	+1.6

Within the prudential indicators, there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its total borrowing, net of any investments, does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2017/18 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

The Finance Director reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage non-compliance in the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this year's budget report.

3.2 Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

The Operational Boundary. This is the total figure that external borrowing is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual borrowing.

Operational boundary £m	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
Borrowing	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Other long term liabilities	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
Total Operational Boundary	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0

The Authorised Limit for external borrowing. A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external borrowing is prohibited and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following Authorised Limit:

Authorised limit £m	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Borrowing	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Other long term liabilities	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Total Authorised Limit	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0

3.3 Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council has appointed Capita Treasury Solutions as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives the Capita view on short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates.

Annual Average %	Bank Rate	Money Rates		PWLB Borrowing Rates		
		3 month	1 year	5 year	25 year	50 year
Now (23/01/17)	0.25	0.23	0.65	1.57	2.85	2.65
Mar 2017	0.25	0.30	0.70	1.60	2.90	2.70
Jun 2017	0.25	0.30	0.70	1.60	2.90	2.70
Sep 2017	0.25	0.30	0.70	1.60	2.90	2.70
Dec 2017	0.25	0.30	0.70	1.60	3.00	2.80
Mar 2018	0.25	0.30	0.70	1.70	3.00	2.80
Jun 2018	0.25	0.30	0.80	1.70	3.00	2.80
Sep 2018	0.25	0.30	0.80	1.70	3.10	2.90
Dec 2018	0.25	0.40	0.90	1.80	3.10	2.90
Mar 2019	0.25	0.50	1.00	1.80	3.20	3.00
Jun 2019	0.50	0.60	1.10	1.90	3.20	3.00
Sep 2019	0.50	0.70	1.20	1.90	3.30	3.10
Dec 2019	0.75	0.80	1.30	2.00	3.30	3.10

The Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25% on 4th August in order to counteract what it forecast was going to be a sharp slowdown in growth in the second half of 2016. It also gave a strong steer that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again by the end of the year. However, economic data since August has indicated much stronger growth in the second half 2016 than that forecast; also, inflation forecasts have risen substantially as a result of a continuation of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since early August. Consequently, Bank Rate was not cut again in November or December and, on current trends, it now appears unlikely that there will be another cut, although that cannot be completely ruled out if there was a significant dip downwards in economic growth. During the two-year period 2017 – 2019, when the UK is negotiating the terms for withdrawal from the EU, it is likely that the MPC will do nothing to dampen growth prospects, (i.e. by raising Bank Rate), which will already be adversely impacted by the uncertainties of what form Brexit will eventually take. Accordingly, a first increase to 0.50% is not tentatively pencilled in, as in the table above, until quarter 2 2019, after those negotiations have been concluded, (though the period for negotiations could be extended). However, if strong domestically generated inflation, (e.g.

from wage increases within the UK), were to emerge, then the pace and timing of increases in Bank Rate could be brought forward.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected that at some point, there would be a start to a switch back from bonds to equities after a historic long term trend over about the last twenty five years of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial quantitative easing purchases of bonds, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising prices of bonds. The opposite side of this coin has been a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election, has called into question whether, or when, this trend has, or may, reverse, especially when America is likely to lead the way in reversing monetary policy. Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as strong economic growth becomes more firmly established. The expected substantial rise in the Fed. rate over the next few years may make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US would be likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in other developed countries but the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong, or weak, the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress in the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

PWLB rates and gilt yields have been experiencing exceptional levels of volatility that have been highly correlated to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. It is likely that these exceptional levels of volatility could continue to occur for the foreseeable future.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is to the downside, particularly in view of the current uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit and the timetable for its implementation.

Apart from the above uncertainties, **downside risks to current forecasts** for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Monetary policy action by the central banks of major economies reaching its limit of effectiveness and failing to stimulate significant sustainable growth, combat the threat of deflation and reduce high levels of debt in some countries, combined with a lack of adequate action from national governments to promote growth through structural reforms, fiscal policy and investment expenditure.
- Major national polls:
    - Italian constitutional referendum 4.12.16 resulted in a ‘No’ vote which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Renzi. This means that Italy needs to appoint a new government.
    - Spain has a minority government with only 137 seats out of 350 after already having had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016. This is potentially highly unstable.
    - Dutch general election 15.3.17;
    - French presidential election April/May 2017;

    - French National Assembly election June 2017;
    - German Federal election August – October 2017.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with Greece being a particular problem, and stress arising from disagreement between EU countries on free movement of people and how to handle a huge influx of immigrants and terrorist threats
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks, especially Italian.
- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, causing a significant increase in safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US.

The potential for **upside risks to current forecasts** for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates, include: -

- UK inflation rising to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and in the US, causing an increase in the inflation premium in gilt yields.
- A rise in US Treasury yields as a result of Fed. funds rate increases and rising inflation expectations in the USA, dragging UK gilt yields upwards.
- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- A downward revision to the UK's sovereign credit rating undermining investor confidence in holding sovereign debt (gilts).

Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2017/18 and beyond;
- Borrowing interest rates have been on a generally downward trend during most of 2016 up to mid-August; they fell sharply to historically phenomenally low levels after the referendum and then even further after the MPC meeting of 4th August when a new package of quantitative easing purchasing of gilts was announced. Gilt yields have since risen sharply due to a rise in concerns around a 'hard Brexit', the fall in the value of sterling, and an increase in inflation expectations. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

3.4 Borrowing Strategy

The Council currently does not borrow to finance capital expenditure and finances all expenditure from external grants and contributions, capital receipts or internal balances. The Council does, however, have a Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) of £3.8m (as at 31st March 2016), which is the outstanding liability on finance leases taken out in respect of plant, equipment and vehicles.

The uncertainty over future interest rates increases the risks associated with treasury activity. As a result the Council will take a cautious approach to its treasury strategy and will monitor interest rates in financial markets.

Treasury Management Limits on Activity

There are three debt-related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these is to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments;
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

£m	**2016/17**	**2017/18**	**2018/19**
Interest rate Exposures			
	Upper	**Upper**	**Upper**
Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt	100%	100%	100%
Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt	20%	20%	20%
Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2016/17			
		Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months (temporary borrowing only)		100%	100%
12 months to 2 years		N/A	N/A
2 years to 5 years		N/A	N/A
5 years to 10 years		N/A	N/A
10 years and above		N/A	N/A

3.5 Policy on Borrowing in Advance of Need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs, purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds. Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

4 Annual Investment Strategy

4.1 Investment Policy

The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.3 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

The intention of the strategy is to provide security of investment and minimisation of risk.

4.2 Creditworthiness policy

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Annex 2 under the 'Specified' and 'Non-Specified' Investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's Treasury Management Practices – Schedules.

Investment Counterparty Selection Criteria - The primary principles governing the Council's investment criteria are the security and liquidity of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After these main principles, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the Specified and Non-Specified investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Director of Finance will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to those that determine which types of investment instrument are either Specified or Non-Specified as they provide an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

The rating criteria require at least one of the ratings provided by the three ratings agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors) to meet the Council's minimum credit ratings criteria. This approach is supported by Capita and is in compliance with a CIPFA Treasury Management Panel recommendation in March 2009 and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice.

Credit rating information is supplied by Capita, our treasury consultants, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating watches (notification of a likely change), rating outlooks (notification of a possible longer term change) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating watch applying to counterparty at the minimum Council criteria may be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

In addition, the Council receives weekly credit lists as part of the creditworthiness service provided by Capita. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utlilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moodys and Standard and Poors. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS (Credit Default Swap) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings (these provide an indication of the likelihood of bank default);
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties and a recommendation on the maximum duration for investments. The Council would not be able to replicate this level of detail using in-house resources, but uses this information, together with its own view on the acceptable level of counterparty risk, to inform its creditworthiness policy. The Council will also apply a minimum sovereign rating of AA- to investment counterparties.

The criteria for providing a pool of high quality investment counterparties (both Specified and Non-specified investments) are:

- **Banks 1** - good credit quality **–** the Council will only use banks which:
  a) are UK banks;
  b) are non-UK and domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign rating of AA- or equivalent;
  c) have, <u>as a minimum</u>, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors credit ratings (where rated):
    - Short term – Fitch F3; Moody's P-3; S&P A-3
    - Long term – Fitch BBB+; Moody's Baa3; S&P BBB+

- **Banks 2** – Part nationalised UK banks – Lloyds Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland. These banks can be included provided they continue to be part nationalised.

- **Bank subsidiary and treasury operation** - The Council will use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee or has the necessary ratings in Banks 1 above.

- **Building societies** - The Council will use all societies that meet the ratings in Banks 1 above.

- **Money Market Funds** – The Council will use AAA-rated Money Market Funds.

- **UK Government** (including gilts and the DMADF)

- **Other Local Authorities, Parish Councils, etc.**

- **Collective (pooled) investment schemes**

- **Supranational institutions**
- **Corporate Bonds**
- **Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper and Floating Rate Notes**

The Council's detailed eligibility criteria for investments with counterparties are included in Annex 2.

All credit ratings will be continuously monitored. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use for new investments will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of Credit Ratings, the Council will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the external advisers. In addition, this Council will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that government support. The Council forms a view and determines its investment policy and actions after taking all these factors into account.

4.3 Country limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide). The list of countries that qualify using these credit criteria as at the date of this report is shown in Annex 2. This list will be amended by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

4.4 Investment Strategy

In-house funds: The Council's core portfolio is around £275m although cashflow variations during the course of the year have the effect from time to time of increasing the total investment portfolio to a maximum of around £335m. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Interest returns outlook: Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.25% until quarter 2 2019 and not to rise above 0.75% by quarter 1 2020. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2016/17 0.25%
- 2017/18 0.25%
- 2018/19 0.25%
- 2019/20 0.50%

Capita's suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 3 months during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:

2016/17 0.25%
2017/18 0.25%
2018/19 0.25%
2019/20 0.50%
2020/21 0.75%
2021/22 1.00%

2022/23 1.50%
2023/24 1.75%
Later years 2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently probably slightly skewed to the downside in view of the uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit. If growth expectations disappoint and inflationary pressures are minimal, the start of increases in Bank Rate could be pushed back. On the other hand, should the pace of growth quicken and / or forecasts for increases in inflation rise, there could be an upside risk i.e. Bank Rate increases occur earlier and / or at a quicker pace.

Invesment treasury indicator and limit - total principal funds invested for greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit: -

As at year end	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Principal sums invested > 364 days	170.0	170.0	170.0	170.0

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its short notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to three months) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

4.5 End of year investment report

After the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

4.6 External fund managers

Up to £20m of the Council's funds has been externally managed since 2003, initially £10m by both Sterling and Tradition UK, but, since 2008, solely by Tradition. Their performance has always been closely monitored by the Director of Finance and reported quarterly to the Resources Portfolio Holder and the Executive & Resources PDS Committee. In December 2015, 3 months' written notice was given that the Council was terminating the agreement, and the last of their investments mature in March 2017.

4.7 Policy on the use of external service providers

From 2017/18, the Council will only use one external provider, Capita, who will provide an external treasury management advice service.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external advisors.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

4.8 Scheme of delegation

(i) Full board/council

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities
- approval of annual strategy.

(ii) Boards/committees/council/responsible body

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices
- budget consideration and approval
- approval of the division of responsibilities
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

(iii) Body/person(s) with responsibility for scrutiny

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

4.9 Role of the section 151 officer

The S151 (responsible) officer is responsible for:

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports
- submitting budgets and budget variations
- receiving and reviewing management information reports
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.

ANNEXES

1. Economic background
2. Specified and non specified investments – Eligibility Criteria
3. Prudential Indicators – summary for approval by Council

ANNEX 1. Economic Background

UK. **GDP growth rates** in 2013, 2014 and 2015 of 2.2%, 2.9% and 1.8% were some of the strongest rates among the G7 countries. Growth is expected to have strengthened in 2016 with the first three quarters coming in respectively at +0.4%, +0.7% and +0.5%. The latest Bank of England forecast for growth in 2016 as a whole is +2.2%. The figure for quarter 3 was a pleasant surprise which confounded the downbeat forecast by the Bank of England in August of only +0.1%, (subsequently revised up in September, but only to +0.2%). During most of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the economy had faced headwinds for exporters from the appreciation of sterling against the Euro, and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, and from the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme.

The **referendum vote for Brexit** in June 2016 delivered an immediate shock fall in confidence indicators and business surveys at the beginning of August, which were interpreted by the Bank of England in its August Inflation Report as pointing to an impending sharp slowdown in the economy. However, the following monthly surveys in September showed an equally sharp recovery in confidence and business surveys so that it is generally expected that the economy will post reasonably strong growth numbers through the second half of 2016 and also in 2017, albeit at a slower pace than in the first half of 2016.

The **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 4th August** was therefore dominated by countering this expected sharp slowdown and resulted in a package of measures that included a cut in Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, a renewal of quantitative easing, with £70bn made available for purchases of gilts and corporate bonds, and a £100bn tranche of cheap borrowing being made available for banks to use to lend to businesses and individuals.

The **MPC meeting of 3 November** left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.25% and other monetary policy measures also remained unchanged. This was in line with market expectations, but a major change from the previous quarterly Inflation Report MPC meeting of 4 August, which had given a strong steer, in its forward guidance, that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again, probably by the end of the year if economic data turned out as forecast by the Bank. The MPC meeting of 15 December also left Bank Rate and other measures unchanged.

The latest MPC decision included a forward view that **Bank Rate** could go either up or down depending on how economic data evolves in the coming months. Our central view remains that Bank Rate will remain unchanged at 0.25% until the first increase to 0.50% in quarter 2 2019 (unchanged from our previous forecast). However, we would not, as yet, discount the risk of a cut in Bank Rate if economic growth were to take a significant dip downwards, though we think this is unlikely. We would also point out that forecasting as far ahead as mid 2019 is highly fraught as there are many potential economic headwinds which could blow the UK economy one way or the other as well as political developments in the UK, (especially over the terms of Brexit), EU, US and beyond, which could have a major impact on our forecasts.

The pace of Bank Rate increases in our forecasts has been slightly increased beyond the three year time horizon to reflect higher inflation expectations.

The August quarterly Inflation Report was based on a pessimistic forecast of near to zero GDP growth in quarter 3 i.e. a sharp slowdown in growth from +0.7% in quarter 2, in reaction to the shock of the result of the referendum in June. However, **consumers** have very much stayed in a 'business as usual' mode and there has been no sharp downturn in spending; it is consumer expenditure that underpins the services sector which comprises about 75% of UK GDP. After a fairly flat three months leading up to October, retail sales in October surged at the strongest rate since September 2015 and were again strong in November. In addition, the GfK consumer confidence index recovered quite strongly to -3 in October after an initial sharp plunge in July to -12 in reaction to the referendum result. However, in November it fell to -8 indicating a return to pessimism about future prospects among consumers, probably based mainly around concerns about rising inflation eroding purchasing power.

Bank of England GDP forecasts in the November quarterly Inflation Report were as follows, (August forecasts in brackets) - 2016 +2.2%, (+2.0%); 2017 1.4%, (+0.8%); 2018 +1.5%, (+1.8%). There has, therefore, been a sharp increase in the forecast for 2017, a marginal increase in 2016 and a small decline in growth, now being delayed until 2018, as a result of the impact of Brexit.

Capital Economics' GDP forecasts are as follows: 2016 +2.0%; 2017 +1.5%; 2018 +2.5%. They feel that pessimism is still being overdone by the Bank and Brexit will not have as big an effect as initially feared by some commentators.

The Chancellor has said he will do 'whatever is needed' i.e. to **promote growth**; there are two main options he can follow – fiscal policy e.g. cut taxes, increase investment allowances for businesses, and/or increase government expenditure on infrastructure, housing etc. This will mean that the PSBR deficit elimination timetable will need to slip further into the future as promoting growth, (and ultimately boosting tax revenues in the longer term), will be a more urgent priority. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, had warned that a vote for Brexit would be likely to cause a slowing in growth, particularly from a reduction in business investment, due to the uncertainty of whether the UK would have continuing full access, (i.e. without tariffs), to the EU single market. He also warned that the Bank could not do all the heavy lifting to boost economic growth and suggested that the Government would need to help growth e.g. by increasing investment expenditure and by using fiscal policy tools. The newly appointed Chancellor, Phillip Hammond, announced, in the aftermath of the referendum result and the formation of a new Conservative cabinet, that the target of achieving a budget surplus in 2020 would be eased in the Autumn Statement on 23 November. This was duly confirmed in the Statement which also included some increases in infrastructure spending.

The other key factor in forecasts for Bank Rate is **inflation** where the MPC aims for a target for CPI of 2.0%. The November Inflation Report included an increase in the peak forecast for inflation from 2.3% to 2.7% during 2017; (Capital Economics are forecasting a peak of just under 3% in 2018). This increase was largely due to the effect of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since the referendum, although during November, sterling has recovered some of this fall to end up 15% down against the dollar, and 8% down against the euro (as at the MPC meeting date – 15.12.16).This depreciation will feed through into a sharp increase in the cost of imports and materials used in production in the UK. However, the MPC is expected to look through the acceleration in inflation caused by external, (outside of the UK), influences, although it has given a clear warning that if wage inflation were to rise significantly as a result of these cost pressures on consumers, then they would take action to raise Bank Rate.

What is clear is that **consumer disposable income** will come under pressure, as the latest employers' survey is forecasting median pay rises for the year ahead of only 1.1% at a time when inflation will be rising significantly higher than this. The CPI figure has been on an upward trend in 2016 and reached 1.2% in November. However, prices paid by factories for inputs rose to 13.2% though producer output prices were still lagging behind at 2.3% and core inflation was 1.4%, confirming the likely future upwards path.

Gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, have risen sharply since hitting a low point in mid-August. There has also been huge volatility during 2016 as a whole. The year started with 10 year gilt yields at 1.88%, fell to a low point of 0.53% on 12 August, and hit a new peak on the way up again of 1.55% on 15 November. The rebound since August reflects the initial combination of the yield-depressing effect of the MPC's new round of quantitative easing on 4 August, together with expectations of a sharp downturn in expectations for growth and inflation as per the pessimistic Bank of England Inflation Report forecast, followed by a sharp rise in growth expectations since August when subsequent business surveys, and GDP growth in quarter 3 at +0.5% q/q, confounded the pessimism. Inflation expectations also rose sharply as a result of the continuing fall in the value of sterling.

Employment had been growing steadily during 2016 but encountered a first fall in over a year, of 6,000, over the three months to October.The latest employment data in December, (for November), was distinctly weak with an increase in unemployment benefits claimants of 2,400 in November and

of 13,300 in October. **House prices** have been rising during 2016 at a modest pace but the pace of increase has slowed since the referendum; a downturn in prices could dampen consumer confidence and expenditure.

USA. The American economy had a patchy 2015 with sharp swings in the quarterly **growth rate** leaving the overall growth for the year at 2.4%. Quarter 1 of 2016 at +0.8%, (on an annualised basis), and quarter 2 at 1.4% left average growth for the first half at a weak 1.1%. However, quarter 3 at 3.2% signalled a rebound to strong growth. The Fed. embarked on its long anticipated first increase in rates at its December 2015 meeting. At that point, confidence was high that there would then be four more increases to come in 2016. Since then, more downbeat news on the international scene, and then the Brexit vote, have caused a delay in the timing of the second increase of 0.25% which came, as expected, in December 2016 to a range of 0.50% to 0.75%. Overall, despite some data setbacks, the US is still, probably, the best positioned of the major world economies to make solid progress towards a combination of strong growth, full employment and rising inflation: this is going to require the central bank to take action to raise rates so as to make progress towards normalisation of monetary policy, albeit at lower central rates than prevailed before the 2008 crisis. The Fed. therefore also indicated that it expected three further increases of 0.25% in 2017 to deal with rising inflationary pressures.

The result of the **presidential election** in November is expected to lead to a strengthening of US growth if Trump's election promise of a major increase in expenditure on infrastructure is implemented. This policy is also likely to strengthen inflation pressures as the economy is already working at near full capacity. In addition, the unemployment rate is at a low point verging on what is normally classified as being full employment. However, the US does have a substantial amount of hidden unemployment in terms of an unusually large, (for a developed economy), percentage of the working population not actively seeking employment.

Trump's election has had a profound effect on the **bond market and bond yields** rose sharply in the week after his election. Time will tell if this is a a reasonable assessment of his election promises to cut taxes at the same time as boosting expenditure. This could lead to a sharp rise in total debt issuance from the current level of around 72% of GDP towards 100% during his term in office. However, although the Republicans now have a monopoly of power for the first time since the 1920s, in having a President and a majority in both Congress and the Senate, there is by no means any certainty that the politicians and advisers he has been appointing to his team, and both houses, will implement the more extreme policies that Trump outlined during his election campaign. Indeed, Trump may even rein back on some of those policies himself.

In the first week since the US election, there was a a major shift in **investor sentiment** away from bonds to equities, especially in the US. However, gilt yields in the UK and bond yields in the EU have also been dragged higher. Some commentators are saying that this rise has been an overreaction to the US election result which could be reversed. Other commentators take the view that this could well be the start of the long expected eventual unwinding of bond prices propelled upwards to unrealistically high levels, (and conversely bond yields pushed down), by the artificial and temporary power of quantitative easing.

EZ. In the Eurozone, **the ECB** commenced, in March 2015, its massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries at a rate of €60bn per month. This was intended to run initially to September 2016 but was extended to March 2017 at its December 2015 meeting. At its December and March 2016 meetings it progressively cut its deposit facility rate to reach -0.4% and its main refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero. At its March meeting, it also increased its monthly asset purchases to €80bn. These measures have struggled to make a significant impact in boosting economic growth and in helping inflation to rise significantly from low levels towards the target of 2%. Consequently, at its December meeting it extended its asset purchases programme by continuing purchases at the current monthly pace of €80 billion until the end of March 2017, but then continuing at a pace of €60 billion until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. It also stated that if, in the meantime, the outlook were to become less favourable or if financial conditions became

inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment of the path of inflation, the Governing Council intended to increase the programme in terms of size and/or duration.

EZ GDP growth in the first three quarters of 2016 has been 0.5%, +0.3% and +0.3%, (+1.7% y/y). Forward indications are that economic growth in the EU is likely to continue at moderate levels. This has added to comments from many forecasters that those central banks in countries around the world which are currently struggling to combat low growth, are running out of ammunition to stimulate growth and to boost inflation. Central banks have also been stressing that national governments will need to do more by way of structural reforms, fiscal measures and direct investment expenditure to support demand and economic growth in their economies.

There are also significant specific political and other risks within the EZ: -

- **Greece** continues to cause major stress in the EU due to its tardiness and reluctance in implementing key reforms required by the EU to make the country more efficient and to make significant progress towards the country being able to pay its way – and before the EU is prepared to agree to release further bail out funds.
- **Spain** has had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016, both of which failed to produce a workable government with a majority of the 350 seats. At the eleventh hour on 31 October, before it would have become compulsory to call a third general election, the party with the biggest bloc of seats (137), was given a majority confidence vote to form a government. This is potentially a highly unstable situation, particularly given the need to deal with an EU demand for implementation of a package of austerity cuts which will be highly unpopular.
- The under capitalisation of **Italian banks** poses a major risk. Some **German banks** are also undercapitalised, especially Deutsche Bank, which is under threat of major financial penalties from regulatory authorities that will further weaken its capitalisation. What is clear is that national governments are forbidden by EU rules from providing state aid to bail out those banks that are at risk, while, at the same time, those banks are unable realistically to borrow additional capital in financial markets due to their vulnerable financial state. However, they are also 'too big, and too important to their national economies, to be allowed to fail'.
- **4 December Italian constitutional referendum** on reforming the Senate and reducing its powers; this was also a confidence vote on Prime Minister Renzi who has resigned on losing the referendum. However, there has been remarkably little fall out from this result which probably indicates that the financial markets had already fully priced it in. A rejection of these proposals is likely to inhibit significant progress in the near future to fundamental political and economic reform which is urgently needed to deal with Italy's core problems, especially low growth and a very high debt to GDP ratio of 135%. These reforms were also intended to give Italy more stable government as no western European country has had such a multiplicity of governments since the Second World War as Italy, due to the equal split of power between the two chambers of the Parliament which are both voted in by the Italian electorate but by using different voting systems. It is currently unclear what the political, and other, repercussions are from this result.
- **Dutch general election 15.3.17**; a far right party is currently polling neck and neck with the incumbent ruling party. In addition, anti-big business and anti-EU activists have already collected two thirds of the 300,000 signatures required to force a referendum to be taken on approving the EU – Canada free trade pact. This could delay the pact until a referendum in 2018 which would require unanimous approval by all EU governments before it can be finalised. In April 2016, Dutch voters rejected by 61.1% an EU – Ukraine cooperation pact under the same referendum law. Dutch activists are concerned by the lack of democracy in the institutions of the EU.
- **French presidential election;** first round 13 April; second round 7 May 2017.
- **French National Assembly election June 2017.**

- **German Federal election August – 22 October 2017.** This could be affected by significant shifts in voter intentions as a result of terrorist attacks, dealing with a huge influx of immigrants and a rise in anti EU sentiment.
- The core EU, (note, not just the Eurozone currency area), principle of **free movement of people** within the EU is a growing issue leading to major stress and tension between EU states, especially with the Visegrad bloc of former communist states.

Given the number and type of challenges the EU faces in the next eighteen months, there is an identifiable risk for the EU project to be called into fundamental question. The risk of an electoral revolt against the EU establishment has gained traction after the shock results of the UK referendum and the US Presidential election. But it remains to be seen whether any shift in sentiment will gain sufficient traction to produce any further shocks within the EU.

Asia. Economic growth in **China** has been slowing down and this, in turn, has been denting economic growth in emerging market countries dependent on exporting raw materials to China. Medium term risks have been increasing in China e.g. a dangerous build up in the level of credit compared to the size of GDP, plus there is a need to address a major over supply of housing and surplus industrial capacity, which both need to be eliminated. This needs to be combined with a rebalancing of the economy from investment expenditure to consumer spending. However, the central bank has a track record of supporting growth through various monetary policy measures, though these further stimulate the growth of credit risks and so increase the existing major imbalances within the economy.

Economic growth in **Japan** is still patchy, at best, and skirting with deflation, despite successive rounds of huge monetary stimulus and massive fiscal action to promote consumer spending. The government is also making little progress on fundamental reforms of the economy.

Emerging countries. There have been major concerns around the vulnerability of some emerging countries exposed to the downturn in demand for commodities from China or to competition from the increase in supply of American shale oil and gas reaching world markets. The ending of sanctions on Iran has also brought a further significant increase in oil supplies into the world markets. While these concerns have subsided during 2016, if interest rates in the USA do rise substantially over the next few years, (and this could also be accompanied by a rise in the value of the dollar in exchange markets), this could cause significant problems for those emerging countries with large amounts of debt denominated in dollars. The Bank of International Settlements has recently released a report that $340bn of emerging market corporate debt will fall due for repayment in the final two months of 2016 and in 2017 – a 40% increase on the figure for the last three years.

Financial markets could also be vulnerable to risks from those emerging countries with major sovereign wealth funds, that are highly exposed to the falls in commodity prices from the levels prevailing before 2015, especially oil, and which, therefore, may have to liquidate substantial amounts of investments in order to cover national budget deficits over the next few years if the price of oil does not return to pre-2015 levels.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. This period can be extended with the agreement of all members i.e. not that likely.
- UK continues as an EU member during this two-year period with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK may also exit without any such agreements.

- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.
- It is possible that some sort of agreement could be reached for a transitional time period for actually implementing Brexit after March 2019 so as to help exporters to adjust in both the EU and in the UK.

ANNEX 2. Specified and Non-Specified Investments

Eligibility Criteria for investment counterparties

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to a maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: These are any investments which do not meet the Specified Investment criteria (i.e. non-sterling and placed for periods greater than 1 year).

A variety of investment instruments will be used. Subject to the credit quality of the institution and depending on the type of investment made, investments will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity or those which could be for a longer period but where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These are relatively low risk investments where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include investments with:

1. The UK Government (such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility, a UK Treasury Bill or a Gilt with a maximum of 1 year to maturity).
2. A local authority, parish council or community council (maximum duration of 1 year).
3. Corporate or supranational bonds of no more than 1 year's duration.
4. Pooled investment vehicles (such as money market funds) that have been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency.
5. A bank or building society that has been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency (only investments placed for a maximum of 1 year).
6. Certificates of deposit, commercial paper or floating rate notes (maximum duration of 1 year).
7. Housing Associations with no more than 1 year's duration

Minimum credit ratings (as rated by Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors) and monetary and time period limits for all of the above categories are set out below. The rating criteria require at least one of the ratings provided by the three ratings agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors) to meet the Council's minimum credit ratings criteria. The Council will take into account other factors in determining whether an investment should be placed with a particular counterparty, but all investment decisions will be based initially on these credit ratings criteria. The Council will also apply a minimum sovereign rating of AA- (or equivalent) to investment counterparties.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

Non-specified investments are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as Specified above) and can be for any period over 1 year. The identification and rationale supporting the selection of these other investments and the maximum limits to be applied are set out below.

	Non Specified Investment Category	Limit (£ or %)
a.	***Bank Deposits*** with a maturity of more than one year and up to a maximum of 3 years. These can be placed in accordance with the limits of the Council's counterparty list criteria (i.e. subject to satisfaction of Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings criteria shown below).	£80m and 3 years limits with Lloyds Bank and RBS.
b.	***Building Society Deposits*** with a maturity of more than one year. These can be placed in accordance with the limits of the Council's counterparty list criteria (i.e. subject to satisfaction of Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings criteria shown below).	None permitted at present.

c.	***Deposits with other local authorities*** with a maturity of greater than 1 year and up to a maximum of 3 years. Maximum total investment of £15m with each local authority.	£15m limit with each local authority; maximum duration 3 years.
d.	***Gilt edged securities*** with a maturity of greater than one year. These are Government bonds and so provide the highest security of interest and the repayment of principal on maturity. The use of UK Government gilts is restricted to fixed date, fixed rate stock with a maximum maturity of five years. The total investment in gilts is limited to £25m and will normally be held to maturity, but the value of the bond may rise or fall before maturity and losses may accrue if the bond is sold before maturity. The Director of Finance must personally approve gilt investments. The Council currently has no exposure to gilt investments.	£25m in total; maximum duration 5 years.
e.	***Non-rated subsidiary*** of a credit-rated institution that satisfies the Council's counterparty list criteria. Investments with non-rated subsidiaries are permitted, but the credit-rated parent company and its subsidiaries will be set an overall group limit for the total of funds to be invested at any time.	Subject to group limit dependent on parent company's ratings.
f.	***Corporate Bonds*** with a duration of greater than 1 year and up to a maximum of 5 years, subject to satisfaction of credit ratings criteria as set out below.	£25m in total; maximum duration 5 years.
g.	***Collective (pooled) investment schemes*** with a duration of greater than 1 year. The total investment in collective (pooled) investment schemes is limited to £40m and can include property funds, diversified growth funds and other eligible funds.	£40m in total.
h.	***Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper and Floating Rate Notes*** with a duration of greater than 1 year, subject to satisfaction of credit ratings criteria as set out below.	Subject to group banking limits dependent on bank / building society credit ratings.
i.	***Housing Associations*** with a duration of between 1 and 2 years, subject to satisfaction of credit ratings criteria as set out below.	£25m in total; maximum duration 2 years.

CRITERIA FOR FUNDS MANAGED INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY

- **Banks General** - good credit quality **–** the Council may only use banks which:
  a) are UK banks;
  b) are non-UK and domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign rating of AA- or equivalent;
  c) have, <u>as a minimum</u>, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors credit ratings (where rated):

  - Short term – Fitch F3; Moody's P-3; S&P A-3
  - Long term – Fitch BBB+; Moody's Baa3; S&P BBB+

- **Banks 1A – UK and Overseas Banks (highest ratings)** - the Council may place investments up to a total of £30m for a maximum period of 1 year with UK banks (and up to a total of £15m for a maximum period of 1 year with Overseas banks) that have, as a minimum, at least at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors ratings (where rated).

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Fitch	F1+	AA-
Moody's	P-1	Aa3
S & P	A-1+	AA-

Banks 1B – UK and Overseas Banks (very high ratings) - the Council may place investments up to a total of £20m for a maximum period of 1 year with UK banks (and up to a total of £10m for a maximum period of 6 months with Overseas banks) that have, as a minimum, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors ratings (where rated).

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Fitch	F1	A
Moody's	P-1	A2
S & P	A-1	A

Banks 1C – UK and Overseas Banks (high ratings) – the Council may place investments up to a total of £10m for a maximum period of 1 year with UK banks (and up to a total of £5m for a maximum period of 3 months with Overseas banks) that have, as a minimum, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors ratings (where rated):

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Fitch	F3	BBB+
Moodys	P-3	Baa3
S & P	A-3	BBB+

- **Banks 2 - Part nationalised UK banks (Lloyds TSB and Royal Bank of Scotland)** - the Council may place investments up to a total of £80m for up to 3 years with both of the part-nationalised UK banks Lloyds Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland provided they remain part-nationalised.

- **Bank subsidiary and treasury operation** - The Council may use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee and has the necessary ratings in Banks 1 above. The total investment limit and period will be determined by the parent company credit ratings.

- **Building societies** - The Council may use all societies that meet the ratings in Banks 1 above.

- **Money Market Funds** – The Council may invest in AAA rated Money Market Funds, including Variable Net Asset Value (VNAV) funds. The total invested in each of these Funds must not exceed £15m at any time (£10m for VNAV funds). This includes the Payden Sterling Reserve Fund for which a limit of £15m is also applied. No more than £25m in total may be invested in VNAV funds at any time.

- **UK Government (including gilts and the DMADF)** – The Council may invest in the government's DMO facility for a maximum of 1 year, but with no limit on total investment. The use of UK Government gilts is restricted to a total of £25m and to fixed date, fixed rate stock with a maximum maturity of 5 years. The Director of Finance must personally approve gilt investments.

- **Local Authorities, Parish Councils etc** – The Council may invest with any number of local authorities, subject to a maximum exposure of £15m for up to 3 years with each local authority.

- **Business Reserve Accounts** - Business reserve accounts may be used from time to time, but value and time limits will apply to counterparties as detailed above.

- **Corporate Bonds** – Investment in corporate bonds with a minimum credit rating of A- is permitted, subject to a maximum duration of 5 years and a maximum total exposure of £25m.

- **Collective (pooled) investment schemes** – these may comprise property funds, diversified growth funds and other eligible funds and are permitted up to a maximum (total) of £40m.

- **Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper and Floating Rate Notes** – These are permitted, subject to satisfaction of minimum credit ratings in Banks General above.

- **Housing Associations** – The Council may invest with Housing Associations with a minimum credit rating of AA-, for a maximum duration of 2 years, and with a maximum deposit of £10m with any one Housing Association and £25m in total.

- **Sovereign Ratings** – The Council may only use counterparties in countries with sovereign ratings (all 3 agencies) of AA- or higher.

  These currently include:

  AAA
  - Australia
  - Canada
  - Denmark
  - Germany
  - Luxembourg
  - Netherlands
  - Norway
  - Singapore
  - Sweden
  - Switzerland

  AA+
  - Finland
  - Hong Kong
  - U.S.A.

  AA
  - Abu Dhabi (UAE)
  - France
  - Qatar
  - U.K.

  AA-
  - Belgium

ANNEX 3 Prudential and Treasury Indicators

Prudential and Treasury Indicators are relevant for the purposes of setting an integrated treasury management strategy and require the approval of the Council. They are included separately in Appendix 1 together with relevant narrative and are summarised here for submission to the Council meeting for approval.

The Council is also required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The revised Code (published in 2009 and updated in 2011) was initially adopted by full Council on 15th February 2010 and has subsequently been re-adopted each year in February.

PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
	actual	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Total Capital Expenditure	£76.2m	£50.2m	£77.0m	£30.7m	£12.7m
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Net borrowing requirement (net investments for Bromley)					
brought forward 1 April	£253.4m	£257.3m	£255.0m	£244.3m	£203.8m
carried forward 31 March	£257.3m	£255.0m	£241.1m	£202.2m	£203.8m
in year borrowing requirement (movement in net investments for Bromley)	+£8.9m	-£2.3m	-£13.9m	-£38.9m	+£1.6m
Capital Financing Requirement as at 31 March	£3.8m	£2.8m	£2.2m	£1.6m	£1.0m
Annual change in Cap. Financing Requirement	-£0.5m	-£1.0m	-£0.6m	-£0.6m	-£0.6m
Incremental impact of capital investment decisions	£ p	£ p	£ p	£ p	£ p
Increase in council tax (band D) per annum	-	-	-	-	-

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
	actual	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Authorised Limit for external debt -					
borrowing	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
other long term liabilities	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
TOTAL	£60.0m	£60.0m	£60.0m	£60.0m	£60.0m
Operational Boundary for external debt -					
borrowing	£10.0m	£10.0m	£10.0m	£10.0m	£10.0m
other long term liabilities	£20.0m	£20.0m	£20.0m	£20.0m	£20.0m
TOTAL	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Upper limit for variable rate exposure	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for more than 364 days beyond year-end dates	£170.0m	£170.0m	£170.0m	£170.0m	£170.0m